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Abstract
Cultural consumption and production are both characterised by multiple dimensions of inequality. 
Research in cultural stratification has highlighted the links between the exclusivity of cultural 
production, the type of cultural works created, and the audiences and public receptions for culture. 
We contribute to this agenda by examining a hitherto unexplored area: the cultural values and 
political identities of workers in the creative industries and cultural sector. Analysis of the British 
Social Attitudes (2010–2015) surveys and British Election Study Internet Panel (2016–2017) 
surveys demonstrates that creative and cultural workers have distinct cultural values. They are 
among the most left-wing, liberal and pro-welfare of any occupations and industries. This sets them 
apart from the average respondent who is relatively more right-wing, authoritarian and more in 
favour of welfare control. When examining their non-electoral participation, we also find they are 
highly civically engaged in terms of contacting elected representatives and government officials, 
signing petitions, political volunteering, political donations, participating in demonstrations, ethical 
consumption and boycotts, and industrial action. Moreover, they are more likely to report that they 
supported Remain in the 2016 EU ‘Brexit’ Referendum, to report unhappiness with the Leave result, 
and to identify with Remain voters. We conclude that distinct occupational cultures are particularly 
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significant in the case of the cultural and creative sector, given creative workers’ role in representing 
society and the civic realm via the products of their work. We also argue that occupational cultures 
constitute an important, under-recognised source of social and cultural division.
Keywords
cultural and creative industries, cultural workers, left-right politics, liberalism, social attitudes, 
social closure, values
Introduction
Cultural production is currently the subject of high-profile media and policy discus-
sion, in particular the connection between who produces and who is represented on 
stage, page and screen. Exclusion from key cultural industries, such as film, television 
and theatre, indicates a need for change and reform. There are numerous examples: 
longstanding campaigns such as #OscarsSoWhite drawing attention to the lack of 
diversity within the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences (and associated 
award nominations and winners); focus on how the film industry is structured and who 
is represented following #MeToo (Banet-Weiser, 2018); recent criticism of arts organi-
sations in the UK, such as the National Theatre and Royal Opera House, for failing to 
deliver on promises of gender parity in productions; and public policy responses from 
institutions such as the British Film Institute and the UK’s Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport to the dominance of arts and cultural occupations by those 
from middle class social origins (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy [BEIS], 2018; Draper, 2018).
Two lines of thought prevail in such debate. On the one hand, there is concern regard-
ing careers ruined and destroyed, or never begun, as a result of biases around who is 
assumed to be the right ‘type’ to be a director, lead a major theatre production, or work 
in particular sections of the media. These systemic biases are well-established by a long-
standing academic literature (Gill, 2014; Wreyford, 2018). Secondly, there is a broader 
sense that the characteristics of those who do enter the sector are connected to the repre-
sentations created, and in turn the demographics of the audience. A different demography 
of production might create different representations and audiences. This latter point has 
been well-critiqued from both a political economy of culture perspective (Gray, 2016; 
Mellinger, 2003), and by critical race theorists of media (Saha, 2018). However, impor-
tant questions remain around aspects of cultural production in the context over debates 
on representation and consumption.
This article develops this literature by focusing on the values of those working in the 
cultural sector, who are thus an important component of artistic, literary and media pro-
duction. Currently, we have almost no empirical understanding of cultural workers’ val-
ues beyond bespoke industry surveys (Creative Industries Federation [CIF], 2016) and 
high-profile public statements (Harkaway et al., 2019). Sociological research can make 
a vital intervention here, by clarifying the values and attitudes of cultural workers and 
how they are patterned (Campbell, O’Brien, & Taylor, 2019). This article contributes to 
explaining the continued inequalities identified by current sociological research on the 
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creative industries, as well as making an intervention into public debates regarding ine-
quality and cultural production.
We begin by situating our interest in attitudes and values within the literature on the 
relationship between cultural production, cultural consumption and social inequality 
(Brook, O’Brien, & Taylor, 2017; O’Brien, Allen, Friedman, & Saha, 2017; Oakley, 
Laurison, O’Brien, & Friedman, 2017; Oakley & O’Brien, 2016). In doing so we con-
nect, for the first time, research on cultural production and inequality to research on 
values. Considered together, these literatures indicate the importance of understanding 
the cultural dimensions of values and value divisions, and the under-researched role of 
values and attitudes in cultural production.
To understand the values of those occupations producing culture, we move in two 
stages. First, we use British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey data to examine the values of 
those producing culture, including those working in the arts and media. We demonstrate 
a major gulf in values between people producing culture and the nation at large, not sim-
ply explained by these cultural producers’ relative youth and high education. We find that 
cultural sector workers exhibit unusually liberal, pro-welfare and left-wing attitudes.
Secondly, to validate this analysis, we use British Election Study (BES) data to 
explore basic values alongside measures of political behaviour in the form of reported 
EU Referendum vote choice and political repertoires, as well as attitudes towards the 
Referendum result and identification with Leavers and Remainers. We identify important 
values-related differences between cultural workers and others in both datasets, along 
with differences in their political participation. These two analytic stages build on exist-
ing findings regarding the social closure of occupations associated with cultural produc-
tion (O’Brien, Laurison, Miles, & Friedman, 2016; Oakley et al., 2017). How different 
occupations foster different attitudes and values has been important for theories of a 
‘creative class’ (Florida, 2002). Until recently, such research tended to celebrate the 
‘open’ and meritocratic attitudes of cultural workers, rather than relating these values to 
questions of inequality, theorised recently by Littler (2018). In demonstrating the cohe-
siveness of cultural occupations around specific values distant from much of the rest of 
the population, we identify a further dimension whereby cultural production in the UK is 
socially closed. This position is mirrored by work on the labour force of the sector in 
terms of class, gender and ethnicity (O’Brien & Oakley [2015] provide a summary).
This analysis has implications for the literature on cultural production, the primary 
frame for our article. It also has implications for discussion of contemporary social divi-
sions perceived as ‘cultural’ or values-based. Our analyses indicate that the values of 
Britain’s cultural workers are relatively distant from the population that they claim, and 
are expected, to represent. Accordingly, understanding the values of cultural workers is 
an important public, as well as academic, area of concern.
Cultural production, inequality and the problem of values
Culture is marked by inequality. Here, we focus on culture in terms of arts and media par-
ticipation and consumption, in turn distinguished from education, religion and everyday 
cultural practices such as language or food cultures (Miles & Leguina, 2017). Sociological 
work has identified how the production of culture is characterised by significant 
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inequalities. Numerous authors highlight the exclusion of women, ethnic minorities, and 
those from working class origins, noting the employment conditions and hiring practices 
underpinning these problems (Alacovska, 2017; Ashton & Noonan, 2013; Banks, 2017; 
Conor, Gill, & Taylor, 2015; Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011; McRobbie, 2015; Saha, 2018). 
Of particular interest is the attempt to connect these inequalities in production with those in 
consumption. For example, recent work on consumption for England suggests that ‘about 
8.7% of the English population is highly engaged with state-supported forms of culture . . . 
this fraction is particularly well-off, well-educated, and white’ (Taylor, 2016, p. 169). This 
‘middle class’ domination of cultural consumption (for example theatre, dance, visual arts 
and even cinema) is matched by middle class social origins’ overrepresentation in the cul-
tural workforce (O’Brien et al., 2016; Oakley et al., 2017).
The overlap between cultural production as a set of occupations dominated by the 
middle class, and that same middle class dominance of audiences for state-supported 
cultural forms, has important social implications (Hanquinet, 2017). Knowledge of arts 
and culture, whether classical or contemporary, has been highlighted as crucial in gain-
ing access to other middle class professions, such as financial services and senior mana-
gerial occupations (Friedman & Laurison, 2019; Rivera, 2015). Indeed, Rivera’s 
conception of ‘hiring as cultural matching’, where leisure pursuits and taste patterns play 
a role in employment decisions, is a good example of the importance of cultural con-
sumption in reproducing social inequalities (Bourdieu, 1984). In the creative industries, 
Koppman (2016) has similarly demonstrated that shared tastes and cultural socialisation 
are crucial to individuals being viewed as the right ‘sort’ of creative worker.
Whilst this literature is extensive, with rich empirical and theoretical contributions, 
the question of shared values and socio-political priorities, as opposed to shared patterns 
of cultural tastes, backgrounds, or demographic characteristics, is under-examined. 
Indeed, values tend to be implicit in discussions of cultural workers’ commitment to long 
hours and exploitative working conditions (McRobbie, 2015), rather than the subject of 
formal investigation. Moreover, this empirical question has particular significance given 
recent theorisation of the connection between cultural production, cultural representation 
and cultural consumption (Hesmondhalgh, 2018; O’Brien et al., 2017; O’Brien & 
Oakley, 2015). The values of cultural workers might both account for some of the social 
closure of cultural occupations, and have wider importance for social division more 
broadly. Relatedly, social and political division has been discussed recently in terms of 
values divides (Jennings & Stoker, 2016), in which context the match or otherwise 
between cultural producers’ values of cultural production and those of the rest of the 
population raises questions about these occupations given their role in imagining the 
nation-state (Anderson, 1983; Elgenius, 2011; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). This task 
has a long history, with contemporary cultural production and consumption central to 
new identities and the formation of citizens’ values and attitudes (Bennett, 2013).
Understanding culture, understanding values
The role of cultural production in shaping values has particular salience given current 
social and political divisions. These are most obviously crystallised in the example of the 
UK’s Referendum on EU membership, whether in the form of media ascriptions of 
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‘winners and losers’ of social change, or generational and educational contrasts 
(Livermore & Clarkson, 2017). They have been addressed in recent political science 
research relating to Brexit (Clarke, Goodwin, & Whiteley, 2017; Farrell & Newman, 
2017; Glencross, 2016; Hobolt, 2016), Westminster politics (Allen & Cairney, 2017; 
Evans & Tilley, 2017), and the emergence of ‘Two Englands’ divided by values as much 
as economics and class (Jennings & Stoker, 2016, 2017).
Sociology has also responded in the form of a social media series (The Sociological 
Review, 2016), a recent edited collection (Outhwaite, 2017), a special issue (Dodd, 
Lamont, & Savage, 2017), as well as monograph treatments (e.g. Seidler, 2018). Whilst 
much of this literature has referred to ‘cultural’ differences or ‘cultural’ explanations for 
social divisions (following Alexander, 2003), attention has tended to focus on those exhib-
iting cultural backlash (Goodhart, 2017; Norris & Inglehart, 2019) rather than those ‘lead-
ing’ cultural change (although Jennings & Stoker [2017], from a political science 
perspective, have explored the values of higher-status professionals). While findings have 
emerged regarding associations between cultural consumption and Euroscepticism (Chan, 
Henderson, Sironi, & Kawalerowicz, 2017), there has been no formal assessment of the 
role of the cultural sector in current social divisions of the type exemplified by ‘Brexit’.
At the individual level, values can be understood as ‘an enduring belief that a specific 
mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable’ (Rokeach, 
1973, p. 5); as ‘conceptions of the desirable that guide the way social actors (e.g. organi-
sational leaders, policy-makers, individual persons) select actions, evaluate people and 
events, and explain their actions and evaluations’ (Schwartz, 1999, p. 24); ‘internal cri-
teria for evaluation’ (Hechter, 1993, p. 3); and as higher-order preferences over specific 
preferences, relating to longer-range goals, ideals, moral values and identities (Frankfurt, 
1971; Hirschman, 1982; Sen, 1997). Such meta-preferences are involved in self-con-
struction and vision of the future, and consideration of themes including ‘solidarity, fair-
ness, prudence, and nationalism’ (Fischer, 2014, p. 59).
We know that values are primarily formed and embedded during formative years, with 
cultures changing due to cohort replacement (Mannheim, 1928/1972; Ryder, 1965). It has 
been found that those born between 1986 and 1990 have significantly different basic values 
compared with older cohorts due to their experience of the recession of the late 2000s, with 
‘increases in the importance of Security-Conformity values during hard times . . . concen-
trated among the economically vulnerable and the young’ (Austin, 2015, p. 149).
Values are also thought to be patterned by occupation, with those of public sector 
workers different from those in financial services, for example. In the following analysis, 
we first investigate the basic values and attitudes of cultural producers, comparing them 
with other occupational groups. We use measures of values relating to some of the most 
polarising political questions: from left to right, liberal to authoritarian, and pro-welfare 
to anti-welfare. We validate findings using a second dataset including relevant values 
and attitudinal items, which moreover incorporates measures of political behaviour.
Cultural producers and cultural values: Data and analysis
First, we consider the values of cultural workers, in light of their advantaged social back-
ground as established in the previous section (O’Brien et al., 2016; Oakley et al., 2017). 
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There has however been little to date on the social attitudes and values of these workers, 
particularly from a quantitative perspective (Florida’s [2002] work on America notwith-
standing). Variation in basic values by occupation forms a lacuna in the literature on 
values, with one exception being Broockman, Ferenstein, and Malhotra’s (2019) pio-
neering study of the values and policy preferences of Silicon Valley’s elite.
We accordingly draw upon the BSA survey, a long-running, high-quality survey fielded 
annually since 1983 (save the 1987/1992 election years). It involves a multi-stage stratified 
random sample, with respondents interviewed face-to-face. Each year it asks respondents 
of their position on basic values, from which are calculated values scales provided with the 
dataset. Balanced left–right and libertarian–authoritarian values scales were first devised 
by Heath and Evans with others in the 1990s. In a paper validating these scales, they con-
cluded that: ‘[w]hen measured suitably, these form consistent, stable and consequential 
elements of British political culture’ (Evans, Heath, & Lalljee, 1996, pp. 108–109).
We analyse three values dimensions: libertarianism–authoritarianism; welfarism; and 
left–right values, with details of the items making up each scale specified in online appen-
dix Table A2 (see note on access at end of article). To check scale reliability some two 
decades following their original validation, we calculated Cronbach’s alpha for each val-
ues scale, finding 0.74 for libertarianism-authoritarianism, and 0.82 for each of the wel-
farism and left–right scales (see Table A3 in the online appendix). We then treat each scale 
measure as the dependent variable, modelling values positions in terms of occupation to 
assess whether cultural workers are distinctive, first by comparing them with other work-
ers at different levels of occupational status, and then in terms of occupational sector.
For the first, we draw on the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification 
(NS-SEC), which categorises occupations across sectors. We use a five-fold categorisa-
tion: managerial/professional, intermediate, employers in small organisations, lower 
supervisory and technical, and routine. Secondly, we use the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) 2007, which classifies businesses by type of economic activity. 
Twenty-one sectors are categorised as well as those who have never had a job and those 
whose work is ‘not classifiable’. ‘Arts, entertainment and recreation’ includes those 
employed in creative, arts and entertainment activities; in libraries, archives, museums 
and other cultural activities; those employed in gambling and betting activities; and those 
employed in sports, amusement and recreation activities (Prosser, 2009). This is a little 
broad, but other sectors are likewise – for example, the categorisation of health practition-
ers in SIC 2007 covers surgeons and health care assistants alike. Indeed, any differences 
we find between cultural workers and other sectors might well be attenuated by the inclu-
sion of those employed in gambling and sports. Using both occupational status and indus-
trial classification allows us to be more certain as to whether any differences are sectoral 
rather than down to occupational position per se. Ideally, we would distinguish sector and 
occupational status within a single set of analyses. The key difficulty is that many sectors 
are relatively concentrated in terms of occupational status, and sample sizes are not suf-
ficient to identify occupational versus sectoral effects. Accordingly, we provide both sets 
of analyses so that cultural workers can be compared with members of other sectors of 
equivalent occupational status, followed by an exhaustive set of sectoral comparisons.
Because the percentage of arts, entertainment and recreation workers in each wave of 
the BSA is very small (between 1.5% and 2%), we boost our sample by combining six 
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waves of the BSA, pooling the 2010–2015 datasets. We make the strong assumption that 
there are no period effects on values over this timeframe. Descriptive statistics are avail-
able in the online appendix (Table A1).
We run an identically specified set of models to examine whether cultural workers are 
distinctive, taking the same set of additional variables associated with values differences 
into account. We first treat libertarian–authoritarian values as the outcome of interest 
(where higher indicates greater authoritarianism); secondly, support for welfare (where 
higher indicates greater anti-welfarism); and finally, left–right values (where higher indi-
cates more right-wing values). We examine how scores on each scale vary by occupa-
tional class (comparing cultural workers with managerial, intermediate and routine 
workers not based in the arts); and then by industrial code.
In both cases, we restrict the comparison to BSA survey respondents aged between 
23 and 65, to exclude student-age respondents and those of retirement age. This yields 
a sample size for our analyses ranging from 11,313 to 11,936. Despite this relatively 
large sample size, given the small proportion of respondents who are cultural workers, 
we do not restrict the analysis to those who are currently employed: those identifying 
with a particular sector are likely to retain a connection via shared worldview and per-
haps intend a return to work. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of scores on each 
scale: lower scores represent more left-wing, more liberal and more pro-welfare values 
respectively.
Figure 1. Distribution of scores on Left-Right, Liberal-Authoritarian, and Welfare scales.
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Explaining this relationship: Occupational values in the 
cultural sector
The data show that arts workers are the most liberal on average of all industrial sectors 
in the BSA. We next examine whether they are more liberal on average than each of the 
other groups once socio-demographic confounders are taken into account, modelling 
values as a function first of occupational class, then of sector. In the first case, we catego-
rise managerial/professional and intermediate/working class cultural workers separately, 
to test whether the cultural sector is distinct when taking account of its heavily profes-
sional composition. We could also theorise that those with particular values self-select 
into different fields, with values further reinforced by the sectoral environment. Given 
that we are working with cross-sectional survey data, we discuss associations between 
variables rather than making a strong causal argument.
In models taking account of occupational class summarised in Figures 2, 4 and 6, we set 
routine workers as the reference category. In each, unadjusted (raw) means and confidence 
intervals are presented in grey, and adjusted (predicted) means and confidence intervals in 
black. In our second, sectoral set of models (with results presented in Figures 3, 5 and 7), 
we include terms for each economic sector, setting arts, entertainment and leisure workers 
as the reference category, comparing workers in other sectors to our key sector of interest. 
Because of the importance of education for basic values (Surridge, 2016) we control for 
differences in educational attainment, distinguishing graduates, those with some higher 
education, A-level or equivalent, the old O-level or equivalent, CSEs, ‘foreign qualifica-
tions’, no qualifications, and don’t know/refused to answer (a relatively large group). We 
also control for gender, social generation, marital status, ‘home nation’, ethnicity and reli-
gion of upbringing (see online appendix Tables A4–A9 for full details).
We find that the effects of socio-demographic control variables on libertarian–author-
itarian values are consistent with the established literature (see Tables A4–A5 in the 
online appendix). With regard to education, every educational group is found to be more 
liberal than those with no qualifications, except for those providing a ‘don’t know’, 
refusal or ‘not applicable’ response. The sizes of the effects are as expected, being largest 
for those with the highest credentials.
Turning to occupational class in Figure 2, comparing each group in turn to routine 
workers, we find (via the confidence intervals presented in black) that managerial and 
professional workers are significantly more liberal than routine workers, lower supervi-
sory and technical significantly less so, while there are no statistically significant differ-
ences between those in intermediate occupations, small business owners and routine 
workers. Those who have never worked appear significantly more liberal, perhaps com-
prising a group of those travelling or still in study. We also find that those in the ‘arts: 
managerial and professional’ and ‘arts: intermediate and routine’ groups are significantly 
more liberal than routine workers. Moreover, they are more liberal than members of the 
managerial and professional group, although the difference is not statistically significant. 
The difference between the two categories of arts workers is also not significant, sug-
gesting they share a sectoral rather than class-based values profile. Nevertheless, these 
results imply that the ‘arts worker’ difference holds even after accounting for education, 
gender, ethnicity and religion of upbringing.
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These results can be compared with those from a model including a full set of sectoral 
terms (Table A5), to investigate whether the arts remain distinctive. All sectors were sig-
nificantly less liberal than the arts sector at the 1% level, including educators, health work-
ers and public administrators, save for information and communication (where p = 0.052), 
households as employers, extraterritorial organisational workers (such as diplomats and 
organisations such as the United Nations), and those who have never worked, where such 
workers were all predicted to be less liberal but where differences were not significant.
To simplify presentation of the model results, we calculated predicted scores for each 
sectoral group assuming mean values for each control in Figure 3. To reiterate, arts work-
ers remain the most liberal even when socio-demographic controls have been taken into 
account, with differences that are statistically significant from all other groups except ICT 
workers (the second-most liberal group before taking other variables into account), 
domestic workers, and people who have never had a job or who work in extraterritorial 
roles (both very small in number). This leaves us confident that there is indeed a sectoral 
difference in worldview.
Turning to welfarist values, in terms of occupational status, those with managerial or 
professional status are more anti-welfare than those of routine or semi-routine status; so 
are intermediate workers, and small business owner-employers, and those of lower 
supervisory or technical status (Figure 4). By contrast, those who have never had a paid 
job are clearly more pro-welfare. However, arts managers and professionals are more 
Figure 2. Mean scores on libertarian–authoritarian scale by occupational classification.
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pro-welfare than even this group, while intermediate arts and entertainment workers are 
more pro-welfare than routine workers, if a little less than those who have never worked.
We see similar patterns when examining the model with a full set of terms for eco-
nomic sector (Figure 5). The arts and entertainment sector is the most pro-welfare of all 
sectors at the 1% level except for, again, domestic workers, people who have never had 
a job, and those in extraterritorial roles.
Finally, we model left–right values. Considering occupational status (Figure 6), those 
of managerial or professional status, intermediate status and small business owners were 
all more right-wing than routine and semi-routine workers once other socio-demographic 
controls were taken into account (Table A8). Lower supervisory workers and those who 
had never worked were not significantly different. In this model, cultural workers were 
predicted to be slightly more right-wing on average in their political values than routine 
and semi-routine workers. However, differences were not significant, and even with a 
larger sample unlikely to be very large in size. The final model using BSA data predicts 
left–right values in terms of industrial sector (see Figure 7). Arts, entertainment and lei-
sure workers are predicted to be the most left-wing of all sectors, but differences are 
generally smaller than in the earlier models, and in many cases not statistically signifi-
cant. Specifically, workers in the water, transport, hospitality, administration, education, 
health, services, domestic service, extraterritorial, never-worked and unclassifiable sec-
tors are not predicted to be significantly more right-wing (Table A9).
Figure 3. Mean scores on libertarian–authoritarian scale by occupational sector.
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Taking the three values measures together, compared with workers of equivalent 
occupational status, cultural workers are the most liberal on average, and the most pro-
welfare (except for the ‘never worked’ sector). Differences in terms of left–right values 
are less pronounced at a sectoral level, but cultural workers are more left-wing than 
managerial and professional workers, regardless of their own occupational status. 
Moreover, it does not appear that the liberal, pro-welfare and left-wing orientation of the 
arts sector is simply a result of cultural workers being more educated or professionally 
dominated: differences between arts workers and people working in other sectors 
increase once other variables are controlled for. These results suggest that cultural pro-
ducers, tasked with interpreting and representing cultural memory and the cultural pre-
sent, share a distinctive worldview setting them apart from much of the British public. 
The differences are admittedly not large given the noise in the data, relating in turn to the 
small size of the cultural workers group (n = 273) in our sample.1
Validating the analysis
To further validate the results from the BSA analysis, we incorporate analysis of data from 
the BES online panel administered by YouGov. The most recent (13th) wave of the BES 
at the time of our analysis, collected in June 2017, has 31,196 respondents, of whom 
26,669 also participated in the previous wave, and of whom 5,832 have participated in all 
13 waves from February 2014. Cases are weighted to resemble the national population.
Figure 4. Mean scores on welfare scale by occupational classification.
12 The Sociological Review 00(0)
The BES is particularly valuable in offering a combination of attitudinal and behav-
ioural variables: in addition to asking the types of attitudinal questions typical of the 
BSA, respondents are asked about their behaviour, including voting, and non-electoral 
behaviours such as signing petitions and taking industrial action. We can therefore iden-
tify whether occupational groups’ attitudes are similar in the BES and in the BSA, and 
how political behaviours vary by occupation. We thereby triangulate between the two 
sources to counter the problem of the cultural sector being small in terms of workforce, 
and to take advantage of robust data at the sectoral level where such sources tend to be 
lacking. While the BSA is noted for its high-quality sample, drawn from the postcode 
address file, the BES, in having a number of waves available for the post-June 2016 
period, allows us to relate the values of cultural and creative workers explicitly to EU 
Referendum vote choice. Its key drawback is its online panel design meaning responses 
are likely to suffer from associated biases, for example regarding poor representation of 
the digitally disadvantaged. Further, the range of values measures available is smaller. 
Measures of workforce composition also differ. Accordingly, the BSA and BES are best 
used in combination to compare cultural workers to others. Together, they offer comple-
mentary topic coverage as well as the opportunity for model validation across datasets.
We use the following measures for comparison. First, we investigate the left–right and 
libertarian–authoritarian scales available in the BES to assess whether similar patterns in 
values exist across the two surveys. Note that these scales run 0–10 rather than 1–5 as in 
Figure 5. Mean scores on welfare scale by occupational sector.
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the BSA. We then extend our analysis with two attitudinal variables directly relevant to 
Brexit, of importance given its relation to cultural divides and as a new source of identi-
fication. First, on a 0–10 scale, respondents were asked ‘How happy or how disappointed 
are you that the UK voted to leave the EU?’, where 0 is ‘Extremely disappointed‘, and 
10 is ‘Extremely happy’. Secondly, on a 0–10 scale, they were asked ‘How much do you 
think you have in common with people who want to remain in the EU?’, where 0 is 
‘Nothing’ and 10 ‘A great deal’, with this latter measure drawn from Wave 9.2 These two 
attitudinal variables thereby capture two elements of people’s attitudes towards the EU 
Referendum, both around an affective response to the result, and a measure of how 
closely people identify with Remain voters.
Finally, we examine two behavioural variables. The first is whether respondents 
reported having voted to leave the EU, or remain a member. To simplify, we set those 
who report not having voted aside. The second is a measure of non-electoral political 
participation. This is an additive scale made up of whether respondents reported having 
undertaken the following within the last 12 months, drawn from Wave 6:
•• Contacting a politician, government or local government official
•• Signing a petition on the internet
•• Signing an offline petition
•• Volunteering for a political party or action group
Figure 6. Mean scores on left–right scale by occupational classification.
14 The Sociological Review 00(0)
•• Giving any money to a political party, organisation or cause
•• Taking part in a public demonstration
•• Buying – or refusing to buy – any products for political or ethical reasons
•• Going on strike or taking industrial action.
The Cronbach’s alpha for the eight items is 0.71, indicating reasonable internal consist-
ency. Taken together, these measures capture a broader repertoire of political behaviours 
and attitudes than available in the BSA, relating directly to the EU Referendum and 
broader civic engagement. As with the BSA, the fraction of people in cultural occupations 
in the BES is small. There are further compromises for comparative purposes. Unlike the 
BSA, there is no variable capturing industrial classification, and fine-grained Standard 
Occupational Codes are also not available. However, the BES team does include a varia-
ble for whether respondents work in occupations classified as the cultural and creative 
industries (CCI), following the DCMS definition (Department for Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport [DCMS], 2016). This group is significantly larger and broader than that in the 
BSA, at around 5.5%. It comprises advertising and marketing; architecture; crafts; design; 
film, TV, video, radio and photography; IT and software development; publishing; muse-
ums, galleries and libraries; and music, performing and visual arts.
Neither the SIC nor CCI definitions should be viewed as capturing only the subsidised 
arts sector. However, again, these broader definitions are more likely to reduce rather 
Figure 7. Mean scores on left–right scale by occupational sector.
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than enhance any sectoral differences we might identify. The BSA cultural workers sam-
ple includes gambling and sports (mostly retail betting staff and gym and recreation 
centre staff), while the BES CCI sample includes those who might otherwise be catego-
rised as private sector professional services workers. Indeed, 88% of CCI workers in the 
BES sample are in managerial and professional occupations, meaning that given our 
sample sizes, the confidence intervals around estimates for intermediate and routine CCI 
workers are large. This reflects the occupational basis of the DCMS definition, in which 
the majority of CCI occupations are located in NS-SEC I and II.
Otherwise, our modelling strategy is similar to that for the analysis using BSA data. We 
use linear regression where the variables are measured on 0–10 and 0–8 scales, and logistic 
regression for the model of Referendum vote choice (Leave support = 1, Remain = 0). 
Again, we restrict analysis to those aged 23–65, with identical control variables as for the 
BSA models, save for religion of upbringing, which is unavailable (using current religious 
affiliation radically reduces the sample size and so was rejected as an alternative). Again, 
detailed model results are available in our online appendix (see Tables A11–A16).
Figure 8 displays predicted outcomes for each of the models using the BES, again 
with (weighted) raw means and confidence intervals in grey, and means and confidence 
intervals after adjusting for control variables in black. Consistent with Figure 4, those 
working in CCIs in managerial and professional jobs are found to hold significantly 
more liberal values than any other group, save for those non-managerial CCI workers 
Figure 8. Predicted outcomes for each of the models using the BES.
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(where the confidence interval is very wide, perhaps reflecting the small sample). Unlike 
in Figure 7, however, those working in CCIs are not here estimated to be significantly 
more left-wing than the remainder of the population. In this dataset, those in managerial 
and professional jobs in the CCIs hold similar economic left–right values to those in 
managerial and professional jobs outside the CCIs. This discrepancy may partly arise 
due to its being an online panel, with participants particularly well educated and politi-
cally engaged, for which sample weights cannot entirely adjust. It further suggests that 
the left–right differences identified in the BSA sample are likely to be small in the popu-
lation if they do exist.
The results for our other attitudinal variables are, however, largely consistent with the 
hypothesis that cultural and creative industry workers hold different attitudes from the 
rest of the population about the decision to leave the EU. This is particularly the case in 
terms of happiness with the Referendum result. CCI workers in managerial and profes-
sional jobs are significantly less enthusiastic about leaving the EU than any other group, 
although note that intermediate and routine CCI workers have attitudes indistinguishable 
from their comparators. By contrast, while those working in the CCIs identify more 
strongly with Remain voters, these differences are not significant when other variables 
are taken into account – intriguing given the prominent emergence of ‘Leave’ and 
‘Remain’ as new political identities (Curtice, 2018).
We also find differences in political behaviour. Behavioural measures are particularly 
valuable in indicating active commitment to engagement (Pattie, Seyd, & Whiteley, 
2003). Those who are highly engaged behaviourally are likely to have greater political 
agency and efficacy (Sewell, 1992) and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 2002), even if their 
political aims are dissensual. Moreover, behavioural choices provide potentially inform-
ative contrasts with values-based measures. The former require explicit choices among 
strategic alternatives, while the latter relate to instinctive reactions to morally infused 
questions, to capture the culture–action link (Vaisey, 2009, p. 1688). Regarding the 
Referendum, only 34% of those working in managerial and professional jobs in the CCIs 
who reported voting said that they supported leaving the EU in the BES, compared with 
52% of the total population who voted in the Referendum. Our model shows that even 
after accounting for socio-demographic variables, a statistically significant difference 
persists between those working in cultural and creative jobs and people working in other 
managerial and professional jobs (see Table A13). While a large literature on EU 
Referendum vote choice now exists, this occupational effect is a novel finding suggest-
ing avenues for further research.
In addition, managers and professionals in the CCIs have significantly higher rates of 
non-electoral political participation than managers and professionals in non-CCI jobs, 
likely capturing both greater volume of participation and more diversified participation, 
even taking into account other relevant variables. This may reflect homology between 
activism for an arts organisation in sourcing funding and support and citizen activism: 
they involve similar skills and resources (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995) in translating 
effort into political outcomes. Civic engagement also reflects access to civic networks of 
political activists and others who are politically engaged (Putnam, 2000), as well as hav-
ing trust in other people and institutions as a basic value (Uslaner, 2000). Our model pre-
dicts that compared with otherwise demographically similar managers and professionals, 
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creative workers engage in about a quarter of an activity more on average, a difference 
approaching half the size of the effect of being a graduate compared with having no quali-
fications. This is of note since in values-related research the ‘graduate effect’ is generally 
considered large (see Table A16). Further research would allow us to identify the extent to 
which this reflects cultural workers’ closer proximity and access to state institutions.
In sum, we find that key political attitudes and values of professional and managerial 
CCI workers appear quite distinct from other workers of equivalent occupational status: 
significantly less likely to have voted Leave, significantly unhappier with the Referendum 
result, and with significantly broader political repertoires indicating an additional dimen-
sion of social advantage and status. For intermediate and routine CCI workers, differ-
ences with other workers of the same occupational status are less distinct, leaving open 
the possibility that the intersection of sector and occupational status accounts for value 
and behavioural divergence, although we remain cautious regarding likely mechanisms 
due to small sample size.
Conclusion
Cultural production is rightly considered an important area for understanding and 
explaining contemporary British society. There is extensive evidence that cultural pro-
duction is marked by significant forms of exclusion, with associated exclusions found in 
patterns of cultural consumption. The role of values and attitudes in these exclusions has 
yet to be fully understood. Our research provides a first contribution in demonstrating 
that cultural production is characterised by distinct values.
We find that cultural workers exhibit values that are unusually liberal, pro-welfare 
and left-wing by comparison with those of similar occupational status and, in terms of 
liberalism and welfarism, with cognate sectors. They are also relatively unhappy about 
leaving the EU, while also reporting having voted Remain to a higher degree than the 
rest of the population. They also appear to possess greater political efficacy, so that their 
position in governing the ‘cultural conversation’ is reinforced by their more extensive 
civic engagement.
This suggests a divergence in worldviews between those tasked with representing the 
nation to itself, and those who inhabit it. It reflects elements of the ‘Two Englands’ high-
lighted by Jennings and Stoker (2016) more overtly pronounced in cultural occupations, 
themselves largely urban-based (Oakley et al., 2017). This divergence has also been 
noted for Britain, France and the US by Piketty in his (2018) analysis of new cleavages 
and multidimensional inequalities.
This divergence relates to a more general question on the relationship between values 
and practices. There is a longstanding research tradition concerned with how media 
frame particular social issues and thus shape and influence society’s values and attitudes. 
Recent examples include work on austerity and politics (Wren-Lewis, 2018); perceptions 
of welfare recipients (Reeves & De Vries, 2016); and factual welfare television (De 
Benedictis, Allen, & Jensen, 2017). While extremely valuable in describing and prob-
lematising representation, our contribution is novel in providing the first large-scale 
empirical analysis of the values and attitudes of cultural workers – with findings which 
suggest why particular frames might be chosen, and which indicate avenues for further 
18 The Sociological Review 00(0)
research. That cultural workers tend to be liberal, pro-welfare and relatively left-wing 
may not be wholly surprising. The question that follows, then, is the distance between the 
attitudes and values of the sector’s workers and the academic analysis demonstrating 
bias in reporting or representation, as seen in theatre (Rogers & Thorpe, 2014), and pub-
lishing (Ramdarshan Bold, 2019).
We are hopeful this discussion will prompt new research to help understand this 
somewhat paradoxical divergence between values and representations. Are cultural 
workers’ values irrelevant to the type of culture produced, because the political econ-
omy of production is more influential? Here the work of Saha (2018, developing 
Gray, 2016) demonstrates that costs, ownership and funding models are more impor-
tant than ‘demography and representation’ for explaining poor representation and lack 
of diversity. If this is so, then we might see liberal attitudes as a key criterion for entry 
to cultural work (as Friedman & Laurison [2019] have observed regarding television 
commissioning), while indicating that these same attitudes and values are insufficient 
for challenging and changing the inequalities underpinning the public concerns 
increasingly voiced.
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Notes
1. To guard against Type I error, we also conducted a range of postestimation tests, reported 
in the online appendix (Table A10). We tested whether the categorical variables capturing 
occupational status and industrial classification were jointly significant in the separate values 
models: in other words, whether the set of dummies capturing (a) occupational status and 
(b) sectoral membership added explanatory power to the relevant models compared with not 
being included. We also tested whether being a cultural worker was statistically significant 
taking the three values measures as joint dependent variables, nesting items within individu-
als. Of the 17 postestimation tests reported in the online appendix (Table A10) all are signifi-
cant at the 5% level of significance and all but one at the 1% level.
2. This item was fielded on Waves 7–10, but survey attrition was particularly high between 
Waves 9 and 10, hence our use of the earlier response.
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